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The Twin Mandates Given to







This research examines the twin mandates of the GSE Act of 1992: to direct mort-
gage credit to neighborhoods that have been underserved by mortgage lenders and
to direct mortgage credit to low-income and minority households. Using the Kansas
City metropolitan area as a test site, data from the GSEs have been compared with
non-GSE mortgage lenders to determine the performance of the GSEs in meeting
these two objectives.
This research finds that the GSEs have not performed as well as the conventional
lenders. Independent of the use of the secondary mortgage market, borrowers are
better served if credit is directed to them independent of location. The alternative
approach of directing credit to underserved areas is helpful only insofar as it helps
to direct credit to neighborhoods that are marginally less desirable than the neigh-
borhoods deemed to be well served.
This research focuses upon the twin directives given to the government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) for the purchase of single-family housing loans. The GSEs—Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac—are the two major secondary mortgage-market participants. At issue is
evaluating the merits of two different approaches to aiding the flow of mortgage credit.
The first directs credit to low-income homebuyers regardless of where they choose to live.
The second approach directs credit to those neighborhoods that have not received their fair
share of mortgage credit in the marketplace. Which approach best serves the public interest?
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To what extent should the GSEs be encouraged to lend in underserved areas that do not
receive adequate levels of lending relative to the size of the housing stock? Is there un-
met demand for mortgage credit in these underserved areas that can be assisted through
increased efforts by the GSEs? What are the housing and employment prospects for bor-
rowers who choose to locate in these underserved areas? These questions assess the place-
based approach to directing the flow of housing credit.
To what extent should the GSEs be encouraged to lend to low-income and minority bor-
rowers independent of where they choose to locate? Are these households choosing to
remain in the older areas of the central city where housing values and job prospects are
reduced, or are they moving to the suburban perimeter where the housing opportunities
and the job prospects are greater? These questions assess the borrower-based approach
to directing the flow of housing credit.
This research evaluates these two approaches to directing the flow of housing credit.
While it will be limited to a single test market, the analysis is suggestive of how the two
approaches may work elsewhere. Are both working well? Are both faltering? Is one per-
forming better than the other?
In 1992 Congress sought greater oversight and regulatory control over the GSEs’ oper-
ation by enacting the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act
of 1992. This act called for HUD to establish annual affordable and geographic goals for
the GSEs’ loan purchases. It also required the GSEs to submit loan-level data to HUD
describing the loans that they purchase, including information on the race and income
level of the borrowers. The research reported here uses the data generated by the GSEs
and employs these data to assess the performance of the GSEs in meeting the goals of the
1992 GSE Act. For purposes of comparison, data mandated through the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) have been assembled. This permits comparisons of the perfor-
mance of the GSEs to the conventional lenders both at the level of borrowers (a measure
of the effectiveness of the borrower-based approach), and at the level of neighborhoods
(a measure of the effectiveness of the place-based approach.)
Prior Research
One of the larger debates in the area of urban policy in general, and housing policy in
particular, is the debate between supply-side versus demand-side subsidy mechanisms.
Supply-side subsidy programs direct public resources to particular projects and geo-
graphic locations. These projects and locations may be selected according to some at-
tribute such as median household income, as is the case with Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) funding. Demand-side subsidy mechanisms direct public resour-
ces toward individuals or households, independent of the place where they reside. In the
housing area, this type of subsidy is attached to the household, not the housing unit. This
is true with the Section 8 certificate and voucher programs. The twin mandates of the
GSE Act of 1992 fit into this debate, with the place-based approach following a supply-
side design and the borrower-based approach following a demand-side approach.
Quigley (1994) argues strongly against the place-based programs of the past. He states
that the problems of central cities are less the result of the movement of population and
capital out of the central city, and more the result of the concentration of poverty and en-
demic racial discrimination in the central city. Quigley states that the lack of purchasing
power is the principal cause of the substandard housing and social disruption found in the
Nation’s central cities. If housing value is a function of the purchasing power of occu-
pants, then the supply of jobs is a key determinant of the long-term viability of the
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housing in a neighborhood. A lack of jobs threatens both the value of the asset used to
secure a home purchase loan and the homebuyer’s potential for capital accumulation.
Quigley stresses that a different approach to urban policy results from recognition of this
cause of urban distress. He suggests that greater reliance on income transfers to disadvan-
taged populations would be a preferred subsidy mechanism to pumping more subsidy
dollars into depressed urban neighborhoods. Quigley states,
Policies should be pursued that place no limitation on the locations chosen by house-
holds and firms; individual policies should be judged by their effects on the spatial
concentration of low-income households and racially segregated markets.1
This means that housing policy should be focused on demand-side subsidies that permit
households to move to areas where they can find better housing and better employment
opportunities as well as improved educational and commercial services.
Despite this concern with furthering the concentration of poverty with a place-based
program, many researchers have focused on the uneven pattern of mortgage lending.
Redlining and discrimination against residents of inner-city neighborhoods have been the
focus of many studies. Schill and Wachter (1993) provide an extensive overview of these
studies, categorized by methodology, geographic scope, and data sources. Vidal (1995)
carries the study of spatial disparities in mortgage lending to the next level. She states that
the availability of credit is essential to the revitalization of disadvantaged urban communi-
ties. She also demonstrates the effectiveness of various place-based programs that are
designed to bring greater flows of credit into underserved areas.
Congress has not opted for one approach over the other in this debate. Rather, it has man-
dated that the GSEs make mortgage credit available to low-income or minority families
and expand credit access to urban areas that have been underserved by the conventional
lending industry. Directing mortgage credit to low- and moderate-income families tends
to follow the demand-side approach by expanding the home purchasing power of low-
and moderate-income households regardless of where they choose to reside. Directing
mortgage credit into urban areas that have been underserved by conventional mortgage
lenders tends to follow the supply-side approach by bringing more capital to serve the
stock of housing in the older, deteriorating portions of the city.
Prior research has evaluated the GSEs’ general performance in meeting this two-part
mandate. Lind (1996) finds, using national-level data, that the GSEs tend to purchase
loans made to low-income borrowers at a rate that is marginally below the rate found in
the industry as a whole. In terms of the percentage of loans made to low-income borrow-
ers, Fannie Mae was found to purchase loans at a rate that placed it about 2 percentage
points below the level of the industry. Freddie Mac performed less well, at about 8 per-
centage points below the industry level. In a similar study, Bunce and Scheessele (1996)
conclude that the GSEs have performed below other market participants. This study,
using slightly different measurement techniques, found that approximately 12 percent of
the GSEs’ portfolios were loans to very low-income borrowers compared with about 17
percent for the industry as a whole—a 28-percent shortfall. Again, Fannie Mae performed
better than Freddie Mac in this regard.
Lind also finds that the GSEs tend to purchase loans on homes located in low- and moderate-
income tracts at a rate that is generally below that of the industry as a whole. In some
metropolitan areas the GSEs performed better than the industry, but there was a tendency
for these metropolitan areas to be smaller, “bedroom” areas lying just outside of larger
metropolitan areas. The Bunce and Scheessele study comes to a similar conclusion,
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finding that 19 percent of Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-insured loans go into
census tracts with low median income levels—those below 80 percent of area median
family income (AMFI)—but that the GSEs have only 12.5 percent of their purchases in
these tracts.
Manchester, Neal, and Bunce (1998) extend the research by examining the performance
of the GSEs from 1993 through 1995. Their research generally confirms the earlier work,
finding that the GSEs performed below industry levels in serving groups traditionally
underserved by the credit industry. However, the research did find that performance has
been improving over time. In terms of borrower income, the research found that approx-
imately 65 percent of the GSEs’ home purchase mortgages went to borrowers with in-
comes above the area median income. Less than 9 percent of the GSEs’ loans were taken
out by very low-income households, which is below the performance of the conventional
mortgage market.2 In terms of the borrower’s race, more than 80 percent of loans pur-
chased by the GSEs in 1996 went to whites, and the remainder went to minority house-
holds.3 In the underserved areas (defined by income level and minority composition)
Fannie Mae’s purchases rose from 21 percent in 1993 to 25 percent in 1995 with Freddie
Mac’s purchases rising from 19 percent to 21 percent.
This suggests that the GSEs have failed to lead the industry in both aspects of the mandate.
They have performed nearly on a par with or below the industry on the demand-side aspects
of the mandate by purchasing loans for low-income borrowers, but they have performed
well below the industry on the supply-side approach by loaning to low-income tracts.
Although prior research has evaluated the performance of the GSEs in meeting the man-
dates of the 1992 act, there has been little investigation of the approaches themselves.
The research performed here addresses the place-based approach to directing credit flows
versus the borrower-based approach. This adds to the debate in urban policy by bring-
ing new data into the analysis and by performing more detailed analysis at the metro-
politan level.
Approach
The approach taken in this research is to examine the flow of mortgage credit into a met-
ropolitan market from two perspectives. The first perspective compares the place-based
approach with the borrower-based approach, independent of lender. Here the analysis
compares the housing and neighborhood outcomes of low-income and minority borrowers
with the housing and neighborhood conditions of the underserved areas. Do low-income
and minority borrowers choose to locate within underserved areas, indicating that there
may be latent demand for credit in this area? Alternatively, do low-income and minority
borrowers choose to locate outside of underserved areas, indicating a desire for mobility
by these households?
The second perspective compares the performance of the GSEs to the conventional lend-
ers. The analysis of the place-based approach compares the characteristics of the tracts
where the GSEs purchased loans to the characteristics of the tracts where conventional
lenders made loans. The analysis also examines the extent to which the GSEs purchase
loans in the underserved tracts of the metropolitan area relative to non-GSE lenders.
Where the GSEs’ loans make up a greater share of the loans in the underserved tracts,
it indicates that the purposes of the act are being served. Where the flow of the GSEs’
credit is low relative to the industry, it indicates that the GSEs have been unable to meet
their congressional mandate to assist the underserved tracts. Similarly, the analysis of
the borrower-based approach focuses on comparison of the housing and neighborhood
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outcomes of low-income and minority GSE borrowers compared to those of the credit
industry. Where the GSE borrowers are moving to better neighborhoods (assessed in
terms of such characteristics as the median value of homes, access to employment, and
the level of racial as well as economic integration), then the purposes of the act are
being served.
The research employs a single market for its analysis. The analysis examines the perfor-
mance of the GSEs in a typical, Midwestern metropolitan area, Kansas City. The analy-
sis has been performed examining mortgage data from 1993 through 1996. Coded to the
census tract level, this case study permits more detailed exploration of the specific factors
influencing the performance of the GSEs relative to the industry than has been possible
using data aggregated at the national level. It is possible to identify the locations of the
housing in terms of the demographic and market conditions that influence the long-term
value of that housing.
Methods
Which factors should be used to assess the quality of the housing location decisions made
by borrowers? Certainly, the concentration of poverty is a problem that needs to be ad-
dressed, as Quigley points out. But which factors contribute to a further concentration of
poverty? Galster and Mincy (1993) provided insights into this issue when they estimated
models predicting change in poverty within a tract as a function of many factors measur-
ing demographic, housing stock, and employment characteristics. They suggest that only
a few factors consistently predict growth in neighborhood poverty. These include overall
job availability, the age composition of neighborhood residents, the proportion of house-
holds headed by nonmarried people, and the poverty rate itself. Other variables proved to
be less useful as they have different coefficients depending on the racial or ethnic
subsample employed in the analysis.
The analysis performed here adopts a similar set of test variables as those employed by
Galster and Mincy. Tract-level and borrower data have been used to assess which of the
two approaches to enhancing the availability of mortgage credit better serves the public
interest. The data sources include the GSE Public Use Database, the HMDA database,
census data, the Mid-America Regional Council, and the Kansas City Area Transit Au-
thority. (For details, see the appendix.)
Each tract in the metropolitan area is examined in terms of the extent to which the neigh-
borhood is underserved by the mortgage credit industry. The various markets of the met-
ropolitan area have been described in terms of the amount of lending that is flowing in.
This type of analysis follows prior research. Bunce and Scheessele established a frame-
work for comparing the performance of the GSEs to the performance of non-GSE lenders.
This framework separately examines lending to FHA-eligible borrowers and borrowers
with standard-sized loans who are not assisted by FHA or Veterans Administration (VA)
insurance programs.
Each neighborhood also is evaluated in terms of the characteristics of its population and
housing stock. The various markets have been described in terms of the concentrations of
households by age, composition, race, and income. The markets also have been described
in terms of the age, growth, and value of the housing in each tract.
Here the analysis employs typical tract-level measures of each tract’s population and its
housing stock.
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Finally, each neighborhood has been evaluated in terms of the number of jobs that existed
there in 1990, the growth in that job base, and the public transportation system connecting
workers to jobs. The types of jobs existing within each tract are also described (e.g., office
work, retailing, manufacturing, or construction).
Given the paucity of geographically identified employment data generally available, this
is a relatively new aspect to the body of research in the field of credit flows. Data are
available for the Kansas City metropolitan area describing the jobs that exist within each
tract, which permits an assessment of the extent to which homebuyers are able to locate in
tracts where employment opportunities exist. A second component of the employment is
connecting the worker’s home and job. The presence of public transit within a tract can
influence the value of the tract in terms of getting the homebuyer to work. Data describing
the level of service provided by the public transit system within each tract have also
been analyzed.
Analysis
Place-Based Approach: How Do the Underserved Tracts Compare
to the Well-Served Tracts?
The GSE Act of 1992 calls for HUD to establish goals for the GSEs to meet to serve under-
served areas. The original goals established for the GSEs targeted loans to the Nation’s cen-
tral cities. However, the definition of underserved has changed to employ the concentration
of minorities and the level of income within a census tract as the criteria for designation.
This follows work done by Shear (1995), who examined the various methods through
which HUD might direct credit. Shear modeled the level of credit needs in metropolitan
areas and found that income and minority status are better indicators of special credit
needs than is central city location. Shear found that not all areas within central cities suf-
fer from concentrations of poverty and high housing costs and that some areas outside
of central cities do. Arguing that the Black and Hispanic populations suffer from lower
origination rates, Shear found that a census tract should be categorized as well-served or
underserved based on the level of income or the concentration of minorities rather than its
geographic location.
This approach to defining underserved areas was given regulatory standing in HUD’s
final rule (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1995). This rule estab-
lishes different definitions of underserved areas for metropolitan areas and rural areas.
The definition for metropolitan areas is relevant here. This definition categorizes an
underserved area as a census tract having:
■ a median income at or below 120 percent of the median income of the metropolitan
area and a minority population of 30 percent or greater, or
■ a median income at or below 90 percent of the median income of the metro-
politan area.
The level of credit found in an area, measured by the number of loans made, does not
enter directly into this definition. Rather, an area is defined as underserved if there is a
high concentration of low- or moderate-income persons of any race, or if it is not of high
income but has a high concentration of minorities.
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Exhibit 1 compares the population, housing, and employment characteristics of the Kan-
sas City metropolitan area’s tracts. Separate listings are provided for the underserved and
the well-served tracts. By definition, the underserved tracts must have higher concentra-
tions of low- or moderate-income households. Given the definition of underserved, they
probably will have higher concentrations of minorities.
The underserved areas are, as mandated, poorer by half, as the typical median income for
the underserved tracts is about one-half of that for the well-served tracts. There is also a
greater concentration of minorities by a factor of six, plus a greater incidence of poverty
and of female-headed households. However, the incidence of elderly persons does not
differ by much.
The housing stock in the underserved tracts is predominantly renter-occupied (60 percent)
versus predominantly owner-occupied (59 percent) in the well-served tracts. The stock is
of lower value; the typical median value is less than one-half the typical median value in
well-served tracts. However, the appreciation rates are comparable. The underserved
tracts have a somewhat higher level of home value appreciation from 1980 to 1990 than
is found among the well-served tracts, but this higher level of appreciation is on a much
lower base value. The underserved tracts have a lower level of new additions to the stock
and a higher incidence of older properties. The underserved tracts have a higher incidence
of multifamily structures, although single-family structures dominate both the well-served
and the underserved markets.
The employment conditions are dramatically different between the two markets. The
underserved tracts have much higher rates of unemployment among the residents who
are in the labor force (11 percent compared to 4 percent). The underserved tracts also
have a lower level of jobs located in the tract and a much lower level of job growth. The
underserved tracts average a little under 9 loans per 100 owner-occupied homes. This is
less than 50 percent of the average for the metropolitan area. The well-served tracts aver-
age 26 loans per 100 homes, almost 50 percent higher than the metropolitan average.
Although the designation as an underserved tract is a function of race and income, it di-
vides the tracts of the metropolitan housing market between areas with strong housing
and employment conditions (and high lending levels) and areas with weak housing and
employment conditions (and low lending levels).
Place-Based Approach: Is the Definition of Underserved
Too Inclusive?
Almost one-half (47 percent) of the census tracts in the metropolitan area qualify as
underserved. They are not evenly distributed throughout the metropolitan area. Instead,
they are located around the inner city, as would be expected. They tend to be in close
proximity to the central business districts of Kansas City, Missouri, and its smaller sister
city, Kansas City, Kansas. Few underserved tracts are found in the more suburban coun-
ties north of the Missouri River—Platte and Clay counties. Only five underserved tracts
are in the very affluent Johnson County, Kansas, in the southwestern part of the metro-
politan area (see exhibit 2).
Exhibit 3 examines the distribution of lending within the underserved tracts and the well-
served tracts. This chart plots the frequency of tracts measured by the number of loans
made in 1996 (both GSE loans and non-GSE loans) as a percentage of the number of
owner-occupied homes in the tract in 1990. This becomes a measure of the level of mar-
ket penetration that mortgage lenders are making within the tract. This exhibit shows that
the levels of lending in well-served tracts are very different from the levels of lending
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Exhibit 1
Comparison of Tract Characteristics of Underserved Tracts and Tracts With Low
Lending Levels to All Tracts in the Kansas City Metropolitan Area
Tract Metropolitan Underserved Well-Served Low Lending Adequate Lending
Characteristics  Area Area Area (5% or less) (Greater than 5%)
Average popu-
lation descriptors
Median income ($) 36,274 24,248 47,103 20,419 40,795
Below poverty (%) 13.28 22.50 4.97 30.14 8.15
Minority (%) 24.09 43.00 7.05 68.74 12.35
Elderly (%) 10.04 10.68 9.48 11.14 9.69
Female-headed
households (%) 13.37 20.20 7.23 25.62 9.44
Average neighbor-
hood descriptors
Owners (%) 50.22 40.34 59.11 43.02 54.21
Median value ($) 63,756 39,864 84,934 29,522 72,439
Appreciation
median value (%) 59.39 61.72 57.29 74.67 54.20
Structures built
1989–90 (%) 1.71 0.78 2.54 0.35 2.09
Structures built
pre-1940 (%) 20.01 31.52 9.64 39.97 14.67
Single-family
structures (%) 66.43 60.10 72.13 66.94 68.13
Number of buses,




unemployed (%) 7.15 10.87 3.80 13.93 5.05
Total jobs, 1990 2,082 1,734 2,399 1,207 2,287
Growth in jobs,
1980–90 (%) 74.21 21.01 122.11 13.28 95.01
Number of agriculture,
mining, construction,
and utility jobs, 1990 406 358 449 265 437
Number of
manufacturing
jobs, 1990 236 259 214 162 264
Number of FIRE/
government jobs,
1990a 1,171 848 1,275 586 1,173
Number of retail jobs,
1990 369 269 460 195 413
Average 1996 loans as
percent of 1990 owner
units 18.85 8.63 26.07 2.75 20.77
Number of tracts 420 199 221 63 330
a FIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate
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in underserved tracts. This would be expected despite the fact that the designation of
underserved is based only on income and race, not on the levels of lending. It is well
established that rates of loan originations are lower among minorities and the poor (Shear,
1995). Thus, the underserved tracts are expected to have lower levels of lending.
The average tract has a total number of loans equal to about 19 percent of the number of
homes in the tract. This measure of lending varies widely from zero (indicating that no
loans were made in the tract despite the presence of owner-occupied homes) to nearly
100 percent where the tract is an area of new development with virtually all homes having
new loans originated. There is also considerable variation between the distributions for
the underserved and the well-served tracts. The distribution among the underserved tracts
is skewed to a low level of lending. However, many underserved tracts exist that have
average to above average levels of lending. The distribution among well-served tracts is a
more normal distribution. Only one well-served tract had less than 5 percent of its homes
receiving a loan, with a modal category of 10 to 15 percent, which lies below the market
average. More than 100 of the well-served tracts had loans originated in fewer than 15
percent of the homes, and more than 40 of the well-served tracts had loans originated in
fewer than 10 percent of the homes.
Clearly, there are tracts categorized as underserved that have high numbers of loans, and
there are tracts categorized as well-served that have very low numbers of loans. This
suggests that the level of lending by the industry does vary, and that a more stringent
definition of underserved may be created that focuses upon the level of market penetration
Exhibit 2
Census Tracts of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area: Level of Lending and
Designation of Underserved
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made by lenders. Megbolugbe and Cho (1993) suggest that such a definition is necessary
but must be premised on demand for credit. If a neighborhood does not have mortgage
credit, it does not mean that it is underserved. Rather, a neighborhood is underserved only
if both mortgage credit is absent and demand exists for that credit. Thus, a more stringent
definition of an underserved area might be based on the level of mortgage lending relative
to the size of the housing stock, using the stock as a proxy for the demand for credit.
Place-Based Approach: How Do Tracts With Low Lending Levels
Compare to the Underserved Tracts?
Exhibit 2 also displays those tracts with low levels of lending. The designation of a tract
as suffering from a low level of lending is given when its 1996 originations are fewer than
5 percent of the number of owner-occupied homes. In addition, the designation is limited
to only those tracts with median home prices below $100,000. The metropolitan median
price of existing housing in 1990 was about $74,000.4 Thus, a threshold of $100,000
eliminates only tracts where the typical home price in 1990 was well above the average
for the metropolitan area. Low lending levels in these high-priced neighborhoods may
reflect a lack of need for mortgage credit rather than the banks’ lack of willingness to
lend. These tracts would not be deemed to be suffering from a lack of mortgage credit;
they would simply have a lack of demand for that credit. This creates a more narrow defi-
nition of underserved areas. This definition identifies 63 tracts as being poorly served
because they have low lending despite the availability of affordable housing. They are,
predictably, concentrated in the inner-city areas of Kansas City, Missouri, and Kansas
City, Kansas. None are in Johnson County, Kansas, or in Platte and Clay counties, Mis-
souri. They are fewer in number, making up only about 16 percent of the tracts in the
metropolitan area.
In many respects, these 63 tracts represent a core, inner-city area. Exhibit 1 also compares
the demographic, housing, and employment characteristics of these tracts with low levels
of lending to the remaining tracts with higher levels of lending. The median family in-
Exhibit 3
Distribution of 1996 Loans as a Percentage of Owner-Occupied Homes With a
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comes are lower in these tracts, the concentrations of poverty are greater, the concentra-
tions of racial minorities are greater, unemployment is more prevalent, and the base of
jobs is barely growing compared with  the strong increases found for the metropolitan
area as a whole. The tracts that suffer from low lending levels have an average income
that is less than 60 percent of the average for the metropolitan area. This is below the 67
percent that were found with the underserved tracts designated through HUD’s definition.
Poverty in these 63 tracts with low lending levels, averaging 30 percent, is more than
twice the incidence of poverty found among tracts in the metropolitan area as a whole.
Racial and ethnic minorities dominate these tracts, typically comprising 69 percent of the
population compared with 43 percent among the underserved tracts and 24 percent for the
entire metropolitan area.
The housing stock is predictably less appealing in the census tracts with low lending lev-
els. The typical median value was only $30,000 in 1990, which is less than one-half of the
figure for the metropolitan area. However, the median values in the low lending tracts did
increase in real terms. The average appreciation was almost 75 percent from 1980 to
1990, which is greater than the 51-percent general rate of inflation for the decade.5 This
is also greater than the average 62-percent appreciation found in the underserved tracts.
However, this positive appreciation in home values did not prove to be sufficient to attract
new investment, as the amount of new construction was minuscule. Only 0.4 percent of
the 1990 housing stock in the tracts with low lending levels was built during the previous
year, compared with 1.8 percent for the metropolitan area.
The employment base is also very poor in these low lending tracts. The 1990 unemploy-
ment rate was 14 percent, almost double the 7.2 percent for the metropolitan area and
marginally greater than the 11 percent found in the underserved tracts. The typical num-
ber of jobs in each tract was low—only 58 percent of the level found for the metropolitan
area. Most significantly, the base of jobs is rather flat, growing only 13 percent over the
decade of the 1980s, compared with 21-percent growth for the underserved tracts and
74-percent growth for the metropolitan area as a whole.
The level of lender activity is very different between the two designations. The 63 tracts
designated as having low lending levels average only 2.8 percent of the homes experienc-
ing loan originations in 1996. The underserved tracts averaged 8.6 percent, which is well
below the 18.9 percent average across the metropolitan area but more than three times
greater than the level found in the 63 tracts with low lending levels.
This comparison of underserved areas to the well-served areas and low-lending areas to
adequate-lending areas does demonstrate that marked differences exist. The underserved
and low-lending areas have higher concentrations of poverty and of racial and ethnic
minorities. However, there are additional problems. These areas also have low levels of
employment and unemployment is high. The stock of housing is of low value and has
little investment in new units, but—on the positive side—the stock in underserved areas
shows signs of appreciating in value at a rate somewhat greater than the appreciation
realized in the well-served tracts.
That these census tracts with low lending levels have a need for additional mortgage
credit seems apparent from the low rate of originations found there relative to other tracts
in the metropolitan area. However, the low lending levels reflect the lower levels of in-
come and housing value found there. If the purpose of directing credit into these areas is
to give greater access to credit to those poor and minorities who reside there, then the
approach can be beneficial. Certainly, the poor and minorities dominate these areas.
If however, the purpose of directing credit into these areas is to assist households into
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gainful employment and sound housing investments, then directing credit to these areas
may not be sound policy. Investment in a home in these areas may not be beneficial to the
potential buyer given the high concentrations of poverty and unemployment, as well as
the declining employment prospects.
Borrower-Based Approach: Where Do the Very Low-Income and
the Minority Borrowers Locate?
The borrower-based approach seeks to help poor and minority households directly by
guiding capital to those households. Exhibit 4 lists the average tract characteristics where
very low-income borrowers and minority borrowers have located. It examines how very
low-income and minority borrowers have fared during 1996.6 The GSE and non-GSE
borrowers have been merged in this exhibit to establish a basis for comparison.
The analysis breaks out the borrowers by those with very low levels of income, that is,
borrowers whose family income was less than 50 percent of the metropolitan area’s
median family income. The threshold of 50 percent of AMFI is generally believed to
indicate “the working poor.” While the exact threshold changes each year, 50 percent of
AMFI in the Kansas City area generally means an annual income of less than $19,000.
Certainly this is a population whose members may need assistance in financing and pur-
chasing a home.
Exhibit 4 also lists the average tract characteristics for borrowers who are members of
racial or ethnic minorities. For purposes of this analysis, designation of a borrower as a
minority was made if any member of the borrower’s household was non-White or His-
panic (of any racial designation).
Comparison of the characteristics of tracts in which borrowers are buying homes indicates
that the poor and minorities are not purchasing homes in tracts that represent a normal
cross section of the metropolitan area. As might be expected, there is a hierarchy among
all of the measures of tract population, housing, and employment. Borrowers with in-
comes below 50 percent of AMFI have the lowest levels among the various measures of
the tracts. Minority borrowers, who may or may not have low incomes, generally pur-
chase homes in tracts with characteristics that fall below the averages for the metropolitan
area as a whole but above the averages for very low-income borrowers.
Very low-income borrowers tend to purchase homes in tracts that are poorer than is typi-
cal for all borrowers in the metropolitan area. These tracts tend to have a lower median
income, a higher incidence of minorities, and a higher incidence of persons below pov-
erty. The housing in these tracts typically has a lower value and is experiencing a slower
rate of investment in new units. The base of jobs is smaller; the average number of jobs
per tract is 10 percent below the average among all borrowers. The unemployment rate is
higher, with a mean of 6.0 percent in tracts where very low-income borrowers are located
compared with the 4.2-percent average for the tracts of all borrowers. The job growth rate
is lower in the tracts with very low-income borrowers, with an average 48-percent growth
of jobs compared with 122 percent for all borrowers.
The poor also tend to locate in tracts that have lower levels of lending. The poorest bor-
rowers locate in tracts with lending levels only a little over one-half that of all borrowers.
About 49 percent of these poorest borrowers locate in the underserved tracts compared
with only 18 percent of all borrowers. About 8 percent of them located in the tracts with
low lending levels compared with fewer than 2 percent of all borrowers.
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Exhibit 4
Average Tract Characteristics of All Borrowers (GSE and Non-GSE)
Compared to Low-Income and Minority Borrowers in 1996
Borrowers
Average Tract  (All Incomes, Borrowers (Very Borrowers
Characteristics All Races)  Low Income) (Minorities)
Average population
descriptors
Median income ($) 46,076 35,319 39,876
Below poverty (%) 5.60 9.94 9.36
Minority (%) 8.28 16.55 22.72
Elderly (%) 8.12 10.00 8.95
Female-headed
households (%) 8.20 11.91 12.14
Average neighborhood
descriptors
Owners (%) 61.11 56.35 59.14
Median value ($) 84,734 58,335 69,416
Appreciation median
value (%) 49.12 46.49 47.54
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) 3.48 1.74 2.50
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) 9.47 16.61 13.53
Single-family
structures (%) 73.72 72.43 72.25
Number of buses,




unemployed (%) 4.16 6.05 5.96
Total jobs, 1990 2,153 1,929 1,760
Growth in jobs,
1980–90 (%) 122.37 48.11 87.19
Number of agriculture,
mining, construction, and
utility jobs, 1990 422 347 330
Number of manufacturing
jobs, 1990 260 241 217
Number of FIRE/
government jobs, 1990a 1,057 948 875
Number of retail jobs,
1990 415 394 338
Market penetration
by lenders
Loans as a percentage
of owner units 24.99 14.03 18.05
Percentage of loans
to underserved tracts 17.83 48.63 39.73
Percentage of loans
to low-lending tracts 1.79 8.31 11.63
Number of borrowers 45,208 3,064 3,671
aFIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate
06-McClure 7/26/01, 9:36 AM119
McClure
120   Cityscape
Minority borrowers located in tracts with characteristics in between those of the metro-
politan area and those for very low-income borrowers. Minorities, compared with all
borrowers, tend to purchase homes in tracts with lower median incomes, greater poverty,
and a higher incidence of minorities. The housing in tracts where minority borrowers
purchase homes tends to be of lower value and tends to have lower rates of units being
added to the stock. Minority borrowers also tend to purchase homes in tracts with higher
unemployment, fewer jobs, lower job growth, and lower levels of lending.
Comparing Approaches in General
Exhibit 5 compares the average tract characteristics of very low-income borrowers (income
below 50 percent of AMFI) and minority borrowers with the tract characteristics of the
underserved areas. These comparisons would not be entirely fair if the characteristics
describing the underserved areas are unweighted. Averages across the 199 tracts that are
categorized as underserved count each tract once, independent of the number of homes in
the tract. This counts a tract with few homes the same as a tract with many homes. Some-
what different averages are found when the tracts are weighted according to the scale of
the housing stock. Exhibit 5 revises the average tract characteristics for the underserved
tracts by weighting them according to the number of occupied homes within the tract.
This weight has been selected as a measure of the scale of the active housing market
within the tract. Using this weight makes the comparison more conservative because the
tracts where there are very few occupied homes also tend to be very undesirable locations.
By weighting the tracts according to the number of occupied homes, the comparisons are
less likely to find an unfavorable difference between underserved or low-lending tracts
and the tracts where the target populations are purchasing homes.
Despite this conservative approach, the underserved tracts seem to be less desirable than
the typical tracts where very low-income households are purchasing homes. The under-
served tracts have higher concentrations of both poverty and minorities, than tracts where
very low-income households are purchasing homes. The underserved tracts also seem to
be less desirable in terms of the median value of the housing, the rate of units being added
to the stock, and the proportion of the units built before 1940. The underserved tracts also
seem to be less desirable in terms of employment prospects. The underserved tracts have
a higher incidence of unemployment, fewer total jobs, and a lower level of job growth
than is true for the tracts where the very low-income households are purchasing homes.
Minority borrowers provide a similar comparison. Minority borrowers, relative to the
underserved tracts, tend to locate in tracts with higher income and lower concentrations of
poverty and minorities. It is interesting that minority homebuyers tend to purchase homes
in tracts where minorities make up less than 23 percent of the population, clearly a level
that will make the racial and ethnic minority borrower a member of a numerical minority
among homeowners within the tract.
Typically the tracts that have low lending levels generate even lower demographic, hous-
ing, and employment characteristics than the underserved area. As a result, the compari-
son with the tracts where very low-income homebuyers are locating becomes even more
stark than the comparison with the underserved areas.
These results suggest that, given the mobility to locate anywhere a suitable home can be
found, very low-income and minority borrowers are choosing to move to neighborhoods
that offer better housing, neighborhood, and employment opportunities than would be the
case if their choice was restricted to purchasing within the designated underserved or low-
lending areas. Even with the weighting applied to the underserved tracts, it is apparent
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Exhibit 5
Comparison of Characteristics of Underserved Tracts and Tracts With Low
Lending Levels Weighted by Number of Owner-Occupied Units to Tracts
Where Very Low-Income and Minority Borrowers Located in 1996
Owners in Owners in Very
Average Tract Underserved Low Lending Low-Income Minority
Characteristics Tracts Tracts Borrowers Borrowers
Average population
descriptors
Median income ($) 27,341 21,306 35,319 39,876
Below poverty (%) 16.98 28.11 9.94 9.36
Minority (%) 34.21 70.45 16.55 22.72
Elderly (%) 10.62 10.36 10.00 8.95
Female-headed
households (%) 17.31 26.35 11.91 12.14
Average neighborhood
descriptors
Owners (%) 50.17 48.93 56.35 59.14
Median value ($) 42,651 29,594 58,335    69,416
Appreciation median
value (%) 53.88 70.76 46.49 47.54
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) 1.07 0.25 1.74 2.50
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) 26.17 38.61 16.61 13.53
Single-family
structures (%) 69.57 74.76 72.43 72.25
Number of buses,




unemployed (%) 8.69 13.55 6.05 5.96
Total jobs, 1990 1,608 1,067 1,929 1,760
Growth in jobs,
1980–90 (%) 20.26 2.93 48.11 87.19
Number of agriculture,
mining, construction,
and utility jobs, 1990 282 221 347 330
Number of manufacturing
jobs, 1990 215 168 241 217
Number of FIRE/
government jobs, 1990a 822 542 948 875
Number of retail
jobs, 1990 288 137 394 338
Market penetration
by lenders
Loans as a percentage
of owner units 8.01 2.95 14.03 18.05
Percentage of loans to
underserved tracts – – 48.63 39.73
Percentage of loans
to low-lending tracts – – 8.31 11.63
Number of households 108,549 28,676 3,064 3,671
aFIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate
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that very low-income and minority homebuyers are purchasing homes in tracts with im-
proved demographic, housing, and employment conditions. The very low-income and
minority purchasers are buying homes in tracts with higher income and with lower con-
centrations of poverty and minorities. The housing stock is of higher value. The stock has
comparable rates of appreciation of that value and higher rates of new additions. The
workforce in the tracts has less unemployment. The tracts have more jobs and dramati-
cally more job growth than is found in the underserved tracts.
Comparing Approaches: Does the Place-Based Approach Foster
Either Racial or Economic Integration?
The object of helping underserved areas is not just to help populations already residing
there but to help revitalize the neighborhoods, possibly through attracting households that
will reduce the concentrations of poverty and minorities. If the households borrowing to
purchase homes inside the targeted areas are of higher income levels than the resident
population or are more racially integrated than the resident population, then increased
diversity can result.
Borrowers purchasing within the underserved areas had incomes averaging just under
$32,700 per year in 1993 (see exhibit 6). This can be compared with the average family
income in the underserved tracts at $30,600 in 1989, the year for which the census re-
quests income. Assuming also that incomes rose somewhat during the years 1989 to 1993,
the mean income of the families in the underserved tracts would be higher still. A growth
rate of only 1.7 percent per year would bring the incomes of the families in the under-
served tracts up to the level of the borrowers who purchased within these tracts. Wage
rates in the metropolitan area rose by 2.3 percent per year during this period (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 1999). While inner-city residents may not have experienced wage
growth at quite this rate, the wage growth in the metropolitan area suggests that incomes
probably did grow by more than 1.7 percent per year. This would indicate that the bor-
rowers choosing to purchase within the underserved tracts tend to be about the same or
even poorer than the resident population. Thus the process of bringing higher-income
homebuyers into these underserved areas is not occurring.
Exhibit 6
Racial and Economic Integration of Underserved Tracts in 1993
Borrowers in GSE and Non-GSE Underserved
Population Characteristic Underserved Tracts, 1993 Tracts, 1990
Average family income 32,667 30,587
Minority (%) 11.02 43.00
However, there is some reason to believe that racial integration is being furthered. Al-
though 43 percent of the residents of underserved tracts are minorities, only 11 percent
of the borrowers purchasing homes within those tracts are. This suggests that borrowers
purchasing within the underserved areas are fostering racial integration in that these bor-
rowers are 89 percent non-Hispanic White while the resident population is only 67 per-
cent non-Hispanic White.
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GSE Performance With the Place-Based Approach: Are GSEs
Helping All Borrowers?
The analysis now turns to the performance of the GSEs relative to the lending industry as
a whole. At issue is the GSEs’ performance versus the primary market lenders. Are the
GSEs performing on a similar level or are they different from the industry as a whole?
Performance is assessed on the basis of the population, housing, and employment char-
acteristics of the tracts where the borrowers locate. The industry samples, taken from
HMDA data, have been organized into three groups, following Bunce and Scheessele
(1996). These groups:
■ Compare the GSEs with all non-GSE originations. This comparison is made against
the total lending in the industry other than those loans purchased by the GSE. In-
cluded are all single-family loans for owner occupancy, independent of the size of the
loan or the type of lender.
■ Compare the GSEs with all non-GSE originations that are FHA eligible. This com-
parison is made only against those loans that fall within the FHA loan limits in effect
at the time. This includes both those non-GSE loans that did employ either FHA or
VA insurance as well as those loans that did not use, but could have used the insur-
ance given the scale of the loan.
■ Compare the GSEs with all non-GSE conforming market originations. This compari-
son is made against only those non-GSE loans from conventional lenders, but elimi-
nating FHA and VA insured loans and any loans over the “jumbo” loan limits in
force each year.7
Exhibit 7 lists the comparisons for 1996 for all borrowers of any race and any income
category. While data are available for the years 1993 through 1996, only the results for
1996 are reported here because the patterns found do not vary in any significant manner
over the 4-year period. The performance of the GSEs also differs from all three non-GSE
samples independent of which sample is examined. Thus, the conclusions are not particu-
larly sensitive to the comparison standard either.
Compared with the non-GSE borrowers, the GSEs’ borrowers tend to purchase homes in
tracts that are more desirable in the sense that these tracts have higher levels of income,
higher home values, and higher levels of employment. Alternatively, the GSEs tend not to
be serving borrowers who locate in the underserved neighborhoods as much as non-GSE
lenders. The GSEs’ borrowers tend to purchase homes in tracts with median incomes that
are about 5 percent higher. The incidence of poverty is proportionately lower. The inci-
dence of the elderly, racial, and ethnic minorities, and female-headed households in the
population are all lower in the tracts where the GSEs’ borrowers locate.
Because the population of the GSE borrowers’ tracts is financially better off, housing
conditions in these tracts also are improved. Over the 4 years examined, the median val-
ues of homes are anywhere from 0 to 25 percent higher than the tracts where non-GSE bor-
rowers purchased homes. In addition, the rate of appreciation of the value of the homes is at
least the same in the GSE borrowers’ tracts or up to 7 percentage points higher. The GSEs’
borrowers tend to select housing markets with comparable proportions of owner-occupied
housing in the stock and proportions of single-family housing. The GSEs’ borrowers
located in tracts with slightly more new housing, and the proportion of the stock that was
built prior to 1940 is slightly lower.
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Exhibit 7
Average Tract Characteristics of GSE and Non-GSE Borrowers, 1996
GSEs Non-GSEs
Average Tract Fannie Freddie FHA Conforming
Characteristics All Mae Mac All Eligible Market
Average population
descriptors
Median income ($) 47,434 47,300 47,587 45,005 40,537 47,400
Below poverty (%) 5.26 5.36 5.14 5.93 6.88 5.43
Minority (%) 7.72 8.06 7.33 8.77 10.13 7.75
Elderly (%) 7.97 8.04 7.91 8.23 8.77 7.96
Female-headed
households (%) 7.79 7.86 7.72 8.56 9.52 7.94
Average neighborhood
descriptors
Owners (%) 61.47 61.41 61.54 60.66 58.73 60.41
Median value ($) 88,080 87,624 88,599 82,172 70,857 88,498
Appreciation median
value (%) 50.01 51.50 48.33 8.51 44.00 48.72
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) 3.66 3.62 3.71 3.34 2.33 3.78
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) 9.26 9.75 8.70 9.67 10.62 9.86
Single-family
structures (%) 74.15 74.39 73.88 73.24 72.32 72.76
Number of buses,




unemployed (%) 3.99 4.03 3.95 4.31 4.72 4.02
Total jobs, 1990 2,173 2,163 2,184 2,137 2,114 2,205
Growth in jobs,
1980–90 (%) 134.52 135.09 133.87 113.28 81.50 141.84
Number of agriculture,
mining, construction,
and utility jobs, 1990 424 421 427 422 397 449
Number of
manufacturing jobs,
1990 256 262 249 264 287 261
Number of FIRE/
government jobs, 1990a 1,080 1,073 1,068 1,038 993 1,084
Number of retail





owner units 25.81 25.18 26.53 24.40 19.62 28.26
Percentage of
borrowers in
Underserved tracts 14.71 15.11 14.25 20.38 26.43 16.39
Tracts with low-lending
levels 1.74 2.13 1.29 1.82 2.48 1.50
Number of borrowers 19,034 10,074 8,960 26,174 19,004 13,092
aFIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate
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The employment conditions tend to be more favorable in the tracts where the GSE bor-
rowers locate relative to the non-GSE borrowers. The GSE borrowers’ tracts have resident
workforce populations with lower rates of unemployment. These tracts also have the same
or more jobs located within their boundaries and dramatically higher rates of job growth.
Whereas the GSE borrowers’ tracts enjoyed an average job growth rate from 1980 to
1990 of about 135 percent, the non-GSE borrowers’ tracts had average job growth rates
of about 113 percent.
In terms of lending levels, the GSE loans tend to be located in tracts that are more heavily
serviced by the lending industry. The GSE borrowers’ tracts have slightly higher rates of
originations relative to the size of the housing stock than do the non-GSE borrowers’
tracts. The GSE borrowers also tend to have fewer loans drawn from the underserved
tracts than do the non-GSE borrowers. In 1996 the GSE borrowers had 15 percent of their
loans located in the underserved areas compared with 20 percent for the non-GSE borrow-
ers. There is a similar pattern among the tracts that suffer from low levels of lending. Only
1.7 percent of the GSE borrowers’ loans were located in the low-lending tracts compared
with 1.8 percent for the non-GSE borrowers.
Among the GSEs, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have similar performances. By most
measures, the two GSEs tend to perform about the same, and both tend to be more cau-
tious than non-GSE lenders. However, to the extent than any differences can be discerned,
Fannie Mae appears to be performing somewhat better than Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae
tends to have slightly higher percentages of its loans in the low-lending areas and slightly
higher percentages of its loans in the underserved areas. This Kansas City experience
corresponds to national studies that have found the GSEs lagging behind the conventional
lenders but with Fannie Mae performing better than Freddie Mac (Lind, 1996; Bunce and
Scheessele, 1996; Manchester, Neal, and Bunce, 1998).
This suggests that the GSEs are purchasing a selective subset of the total loans originated
in the primary market. The GSE borrowers’ loans are located in areas with better housing
and higher employment. This is certainly beneficial to the households involved. However,
it also means that the GSEs are not purchasing loans in the poorer neighborhoods at the
same rates as conventional lenders. The tracts served by the GSEs tend to be the tracts
that are already well served by the lending industry. The GSEs appear to be avoiding the
underserved and low lending level tracts much more so than the non-GSE primary lenders.
GSE Performance With the Borrower-Based Approach: Helping
Very Low-Income and Minority Borrowers
If the GSEs serve tracts that are more well off in terms of the tracts’ demographic, hous-
ing, and employment characteristics, it is beneficial to the borrowers involved. Unfortu-
nately, this is not helpful to the underserved tracts and the tracts suffering from low lending
levels. This describes the performance of the GSEs for all borrowers, independent of each
borrower’s race or income. However, the GSEs are mandated to serve low-income and
minority borrowers. If they are not succeeding in serving the underserved areas, are
the GSEs performing well in terms of serving the target populations of the poor and
the minorities?
Exhibit 8 examines the percentage of borrowers within each lender category that are very
low-income. In order to identify the truly needy households, for whom housing afford-
ability is a problem, only the very low-income are examined, that is, those with income
below 50 percent of the metropolitan area’s median family income for the year being
examined. Exhibit 8 also examines the percentage of borrowers who are members of
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Exhibit 8
Percentage of Borrowers That Are Very Low-Income or Minority by Lender Type
and Year for All Tracts, Underserved Tracts, and Tracts With Low Lending
Levels, 1993–96
GSEs Non-GSEs
Percent Fannie Freddie FHA Conforming
Year Tracts of Loans All Mae Mac All Eligible Market
1993 All tracts Very
low-income 2.05 2.12 1.98 8.53 9.96 9.01
Minorities 3.95 3.99 3.90 7.40 7.88 6.44
Under- Very
served low-income 6.47 6.03 6.93 19.26 19.85 24.94
Minorities 8.15 8.58 7.83 16.35 16.81 16.43
Low Very
lending low-income 10.82 8.96 14.77 33.03 33.13 46.43
Minorities 38.53 30.60 53.93 49.24 49.39 57.14
1994 All tracts Very
low-income 4.62 5.64 3.46 8.69 11.38 9.19
Minorities 5.63 6.32 4.84 8.47 9.59 8.13
Under- Very
served low-income 12.63 14.78 9.20 22.64 23.74 27.92
Minorities 12.23 13.43 10.36 18.79 19.37 20.80
Low Very
lending low-income 14.24 16.27 9.21 41.22 41.63 48.84
Minorities 34.72 33.49 40.00 57.07 57.39 66.05
1995 All tracts Very
low-income 6.27 7.30 4.78 8.71 11.69 7.75
Minorities 7.74 8.11 7.19 9.47 10.89 7.81
Under- Very
served low-income 18.32 20.53 14.40 21.96 23.21 22.64
Minorities 16.50 19.08 11.89 19.90 20.58 20.18
Low Very
lending low-income 37.76 37.33 40.00 37.80 38.12 35.48
Minorities 50.51 51.66 47.73 55.68 55.83 59.91
1996 All tracts Very
low-income 5.41 6.27 4.44 8.08 11.03 7.62
Minorities 6.84 8.02 5.50 8.84 10.32 7.05
Under- Very
served low-income 16.28 19.82 12.13 20.61 21.75 22.07
Minorities 16.01 21.03 10.08 18.86 19.28 18.17
Low Very
lending low-income 28.95 37.50 14.02 36.13 36.49 39.90
Minorities 54.09 63.96 40.95 53.49 53.63 59.62
Note: Very low-income is defined as having an income of less than 50 percent of the area median
family income.
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racial or ethnic minorities (at any income level). Minority membership is defined as a
household identified as being non-White or Hispanic.
Exhibit 8 illustrates that the GSEs generally perform below the levels of the mortgage
industry in terms of serving very low-income and minority borrowers. However, their
performance is improving as the GSEs close the gap between themselves and the pri-
mary lenders serving the non-GSE market. This coincides with the findings of Manches-
ter, Neal, and Bunce (1998) who find, on a national scale, that the GSEs are performing
below their goals of serving low-income and minority borrowers but are improving in
that performance.
Typically, the GSEs have 2 to 6 percent of their borrowers who are very low-income
households. This is well short of the 8 to 9 percent found with the non-GSE industry lend-
ers. This means that the GSEs fell well behind the industry in each of the 4 years studied.
The shortfall was more than  6 percentage points in 1993 and 4 percentage points in 1994.
The gap narrowed to 1.5 percentage points in 1995 but widened again to 2.6 percentage
points in 1996.
Approximately the same pattern is found when examining only those borrowers that lo-
cated in the underserved tracts or tracts with low lending levels. The proportions of bor-
rowers in these tracts who are of very low-income are, not surprisingly, significantly
higher. Typically 6 to 16 percent of the GSEs’ borrowers in underserved tracts are very
low-income borrowers, and this number has been increasing with time. This performance
has been 4 to 13 percentage points behind the performance of the non-GSE lenders, but
the gap is closing. Similarly, in the tracts with low lending levels, the GSEs serve even
more very low-income borrowers (10 to 40 percent) but fall up to 26 percentage points
behind the industry, with the gap generally narrowing.
Given the high correlation between minority status and incidence of poverty, it is not
surprising that the comparisons between the GSEs and the non-GSEs in terms of serving
racial and ethnic minorities is very similar to those found with very low-income borrow-
ers. Generally, the GSEs purchase a lower proportion of loans made with minority house-
holds than is true among the non-GSE loans. However, as with the very low-income
borrowers, the gap between the performance of the GSEs and the non-GSEs is closing.
Across the metropolitan area, the GSEs purchase loans with 4 to 8 percent made to minor-
ity borrowers. However, the non-GSEs originate 7 to 9 percent of their loans with minori-
ties. The typical spread between the GSEs and the comparison groups was 3 percentage
points in 1993 and 1994, but it fell to 2 percentage points in 1995 and 1996.
Within only the underserved tracts and the tracts with low levels of lending, the GSEs do
purchase more loans from minority borrowers than is true across all tracts of the metro-
politan area, but the spread between the performance of the GSEs and the non-GSEs has
been greater as well. The GSEs purchase loans located in the underserved tracts with 6
to 18 percent of these loans having minority borrowers. However, the non-GSEs tend to
perform better, by 8 percentage points in 1993 and 2 percentage points in 1996. In the
tracts with low lending levels, the GSEs’ loans typically have anywhere from 35 to
54 percent minority borrowers, but the non-GSEs outperformed them by 11 percentage
points in 1993, 13 points in 1994, and 6 points in 1995. In 1996 the GSEs actually outper-
formed the non-GSEs, but by less than a single percentage point.
In virtually all of these comparisons of lending to very low-income borrowers and to
minority borrowers, the two GSEs performed similarly. Both Fannie Mae and Freddie
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Mac trailed the conventional lenders. However, following the pattern found previously,
Fannie Mae tended to outperform Freddie Mac by having slightly higher percentages of
loans with very low-income borrowers and with minority borrowers.
GSE Performance With the Borrower-Based Approach: Where Do
Very Low-Income Borrowers Locate?
The GSEs appear to lag behind the non-GSEs in serving very low-income borrowers. This
does not mean that they do not serve very low-income borrowers at all; rather, it means
that the GSEs serve very low-income borrowers in smaller numbers than they probably
should. However, among the very low-income borrowers whose loans are purchased by
the GSEs, where do they locate? If these very low-income borrowers tend to locate in
significantly better neighborhoods with better demographic, housing, and employment
characteristics, then it would suggest that the borrower-based approach to directing credit
to needy populations is aiding the mobility of these borrowers. This mobility may be
helping them move to better neighborhoods, although this may be furthering the move-
ment of households out of the inner city toward the suburbs. Alternatively, if these very
low-income borrowers tend to locate within the underserved neighborhoods, then it would
suggest that the efforts to direct credit to the poor are also serving the mortgage credit
needs of the inner city.
To make this determination it is necessary to quantify the characteristics of the housing
markets where GSEs’ very low-income borrowers are locating and compare these charac-
teristics to those of the non-GSEs’ very low-income borrowers. Exhibit 9 makes these
comparisons for the year 1996.
Generally, the GSEs are purchasing loans made to very low-income borrowers who locate
in neighborhoods that have more desirable demographic, housing, and employment char-
acteristics than is true for the non-GSEs. This was found for all 4 years studied (1993
through 1996), but there appears to be a trend over the years. The trend is for the differ-
ences between the tract characteristics of the GSEs’ low-income borrowers to be less
different from those of the non-GSEs’ over time. This narrowing of the gap seems to be
due to the GSEs’ purchasing loans that are less and less selective over time rather than
due to any significant change in the performance of the non-GSEs. Even with this gap
between the GSEs and the non-GSEs, it is important to recognize that the differences
between them are not large in all areas. Many of the comparisons generate mixed results
either across the various comparison groups or over the years examined.
Specifically, in all 4 years across all non-GSE comparison groups, the GSEs’ loans to
very low-income borrowers were located in tracts with higher median incomes and lower
levels of poverty. There were mixed results in the comparisons of the concentrations of
minorities as well as the incidence of elderly and female-headed households. Similarly,
the GSEs’ very low-income borrowers were located in tracts with higher median value
homes and higher percentages of owner-occupied housing. There were mixed results in
the comparisons of the percentages of new and pre-1940 housing as well as the apprecia-
tion rates, the presence of public transit, and the percentage of single-family housing. The
GSEs’ very low-income borrowers were located in tracts with generally lower levels of
unemployment and greater rates of job growth within the tracts. There were mixed results
in the comparisons of numbers of jobs with the GSEs’ very low-income borrowers locat-
ing in tracts with greater numbers of jobs in the years 1993 through 1995, but in 1996, the
GSEs’ and non-GSEs’ very low-income borrowers located in tracts with similar numbers
of jobs.
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Exhibit 9
Characteristics of Tracts Where Very Low-Income Borrowers Purchased
Homes, 1996
GSEs Non-GSEs
Average Tract Fannie Freddie FHA Conforming
Characteristics All Mae Mac All Eligible Market
Average population
descriptors
Median income ($) 36,437 35,657 37,688 34,444 34,397 35,590
Below poverty (%) 9.51 10.52 7.89 10.51 10.54 10.24
Minority (%) 17.05 19.93 12.42 16.66 16.73 15.40
Elderly (%) 10.10 10.51 9.44 9.92 9.94 9.41
Female-headed
households (%) 11.66 12.35 0.55 12.31 12.33 12.07
Average neighborhood
descriptors
Owners (%) 57.13 56.39 58.33 55.01 55.00 53.10
Median value ($) 60,731 58,580 64,184 56,601 56,478 60,080
Appreciation median
value (%) 47.35 49.21 44.14 45.72 45.76 45.16
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) 1.68 1.49 1.97 1.73 1.72 1.87
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) 16.75 19.57 12.22 16.73 16.78 17.72
Single-family
structures (%) 72.93 73.02 72.78 71.30 71.27 69.92
Number of buses,




unemployed (%) 5.94 6.27 5.42 6.21 6.23 6.06
Total jobs, 1990 1,889 1,879 1,904 1,946 1,947 2,034
Growth in jobs,
1980-90 (%) 51.52 41.99 66.81 45.81 45.68 56.37
Number of agriculture,
mining, construction,
and utility jobs, 1990 333 330 337 366 367 402
Number of
manufacturing jobs,
1990 219 223 213 256 256 267
Number of FIRE/
government jobs, 1990a 936 951 913 939 938 983
Number of retail
jobs, 1990 400 376 441 385 385 382
Average market
penetration by lenders
Loans as a percentage
of owner units 12.93 12.19 14.12 14.52 14.44 17.83
Percentage of
borrowers in
Underserved tracts 44.19 47.66 38.59 51.97 52.14 47.46
Tracts with
low-lending levels 9.22 12.71 3.63 8.29 8.38 8.09
Number of borrowers 1,024 628 396 2,050 2,039 931
a FIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate
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In terms of the level of mortgage lender activity in the tracts where the very low-income
borrowers located, the results were mixed. The GSEs’ borrowers located in tracts with
higher to comparable levels of loans as a percentage of owner-occupied units. Similarly,
the percentages of GSEs’ borrowers found in underserved and low lending areas were
generally below or on a par with that of the non-GSEs’ borrowers.
GSE Performance With the Borrower-Based Approach: Where Do
Minority Borrowers Locate?
Exhibit 10 repeats the analysis of the borrower-based approach for minority borrowers.
In general, the GSEs’ minority borrowers are found to reside in more desirable neighbor-
hoods than do minority borrowers from the non-GSE lenders. This is assessed in terms of
the demographic characteristics of the residents, the value of the housing, the employment
opportunities, and the level of other lending activity.
The comparisons of population factors show that the GSEs’ minority borrowers are lo-
cated in tracts with higher median household income levels, lower levels of poverty, and
fewer female-headed households. Interestingly, the minority borrowers do not seem to be
located in tracts where minorities dominate the population. In 1996 the GSEs’ borrowers
were located in tracts with an average of 23 percent of the population comprised of mi-
norities. The non-GSE borrowers were also located in tracts with 23-percent minority
population, well below a level of dominance. This comparison finds the minority borrow-
ers locating in tracts that are on a par with the metropolitan area’s average of about 23-
percent minority population.
The comparisons of housing factors show that the GSEs’ minority borrowers are located
in neighborhoods with significantly higher median home values than for non-GSE minor-
ity borrowers. The GSEs’ minority borrowers’ tracts also have higher rates of growth of
the housing stock with more recently built units, but the tracts have about the same inci-
dence of older, pre-1940 units. The GSEs’ minority borrowers also were located in tracts
with lower levels of public transit service.
The comparisons of employment factors generally find the GSEs’ minority borrowers to
have located in neighborhoods with greater employment opportunities. The numbers of
jobs are typically greater in the tracts where the GSEs’ minority borrowers located. The
rate of growth of jobs is also much higher in the GSEs’ minority borrower tracts than in
the non-GSEs’ tracts.
The GSEs’ minority borrowers located in tracts with higher levels of lender activity, with
an average of 20 percent of the owner-occupied homes having loans originated. This is
above the 17-percent average for the non-GSE borrowers. The GSEs’ minority borrowers
generally had smaller proportions of their loans in the underserved tracts and tracts with
low levels of lending. Here the differences were dramatic. The spread between the GSEs
and the non-GSEs was 9 percentage points for the underserved areas. Only in 1996 did
the GSEs outperform the non-GSEs in the low lending tracts. In that year, the GSEs had
13.6 percent of loans from minority borrowers located in the low-lending tracts compared
to 11.1 percent for the non-GSEs.
Multivariate Models: Which Factors Explain the Variation Between
the GSEs and the Industry?
The various comparisons examine only single factors independent of the influence of the
other factors. The comparisons suggest which factors are important, but taken together, it
is unclear which factors seem to explain the differences between the performance of the
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Exhibit 10
Characteristics of Tracts Where Minority Borrowers Purchased Homes, 1996
GSEs Non-GSEs
Average Tract Fannie Freddie FHA Conforming
Characteristics All Mae Mac All Eligible Market
Average population
descriptors
Median income ($) 41,840 40,226 44,527 38,515 35,495            40,234
Below poverty (%) 9.19 10.42 7.15 9.73 10.78 10.30
Minority (%) 22.77 26.58 16.43 23.08 25.91 23.65
Elderly (%) 8.91 9.08 8.62 8.96 9.16 8.86
Female-headed
households (%) 11.84 12.93 10.03 12.48 13.54 12.57
Average neighborhood
descriptors
Owners (%) 59.25 58.76 60.07 58.72 57.94 56.98
Median value ($) 74,754 70,802 81,334 65,895 58,080 71,286
Appreciation median
value (%) 751.23 53.48 47.50 45.58 45.32 48.1
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) 2.87 2.66 3.23 2.26 1.48 2.80
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) 13.97 16.45 9.83 13.59 15.09 15.74
Single-family
structures (%) 72.20 72.76 71.26 72.10 72.50 69.89
Number of buses,




unemployed (%) 5.81 6.31 4.97 6.16 6.52 6.19
Total jobs, 1990 1,867 1,834 1,921 1,701 1,645 1,844
Growth in jobs,
1980–90 (%) 111.39 95.81 137.31 72.67 48.36 98.82
Number of agriculture,
mining, construction,
and utility jobs, 1990 358 355 363 320 303 368
Number of
manufacturing jobs,
1990 207 188 240 227 226 234
Number of FIRE/
government jobs, 1990a 961 959 963 820 780 916
Number of retail
jobs, 1990 341 332 355 334 336 327
Average market
penetration by lenders
Loans as a percentage
of owner units 20.18 18.46 23.03 16.76 12.50 21.15
Percentage of
borrowers in
Underserved tracts 34.39 39.50 25.88 43.46 49.40 42.26
Tracts with
low-lending levels 13.63 16.77 8.43 11.06 12.93 12.78
Number of borrowers 1,325 827 498 2,361 2,007 945
a FIRE = finance, insurance, and real estate
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GSEs relative to the industry. To address this issue, a set of multivariate models have
been prepared to explain the variation in the GSE performance relative to the performance
of the lending industry as a whole.
Exhibits 11 through 14 describe a set of models that have been estimated using various
samples. In each case, the dependent variable calibrates the GSE loans as a percent of all
loans for the census tract. This dependent variable ranges widely. When this variable has
a low value, it indicates that the GSEs have not played a strong role in purchasing loans
for the sample in question. In effect, the non-GSEs have disproportionately provided the
credit to this segment of the market. When this variable has a high value, it indicates that
the GSEs perform strongly relative to the non-GSE lenders. The variation in the depen-
dent variable has been explained by a set of variables that correspond to the population,
housing, employment, and lending activity variables used in the earlier comparisons. The
models have been estimated for four different samples: for all tracts to proxy the place-
based approach; for all borrowers to proxy the borrower-based approach; for all very low-
income borrowers; and for all minority borrowers. Models have been estimated separately
for the years 1993 through 1996 for each sample.
Of primary concern with the estimation of these models is the identification of which
independent variables are significant and appear to explain the greatest share of the varia-
tion in the GSEs’ share of total lending.
It has been well established in prior research that the GSEs have lagged behind the pri-
mary lending industry in their underwriting of home mortgage loans to targeted areas and
to targeted populations. The analysis reported here suggests that the performance of the
GSEs in the Kansas City metropolitan housing market corresponds to the national find-
ings, with the GSEs favoring loans in neighborhood markets where the housing stock has
high value and enjoys strong growth. Thus, it is expected that the housing market descrip-
tors will be significant and directly associated with a higher level of GSE entry into the
market. Better housing is expected to explain greater GSE lending as a share of total lend-
ing, as good underwriting would predict.
While not a part of the underwriting process, the demographic makeup of each tract may
influence the level of GSE participation in a market. If the GSEs are responding to the
place-based programs by directing credit into traditionally underserved areas, there should
be a direct relationship between the presence of low-income households and GSE share of
lending. Similarly, there should be a direct relationship between the presence of minority
households and the GSE share of lending.
However, this research focuses on evaluating alternative public policy approaches, the
place-based and the borrower-based methods of directing credit flows. One of the central
concerns of this evaluation is to distinguish whether or not such matters as employment
opportunities play a strong role in guiding a borrower’s home purchase decision. If em-
ployment opportunities are found to be inversely associated with GSE activity in the tract-
level analysis, then the place-based approach would appear to be directing credit to areas
where the long-term interests of the homebuyers are diminished. Alternatively, if em-
ployment opportunities are directly associated with the GSE activity with the borrower-
level analysis, then the borrower-based approach would appear to be helping borrowers
locate where they not only can have good homes but good chances for finding permanent
employment.
Analysis for All Tracts. Generally, these models, summarized in Exhibit 11, are not
strong (R2 scores range from .47 for the 1993 model to .23 for the 1995 model), but they
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Exhibit 11
Multivariate Analysis of GSE Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans—
Tract Level Analysis: All Tracts
Independent Variables 1993 1994 1995 1996
Population descriptors
Median income ($) –0.0002 –0.00001 –0.00032* –0.00024
Below poverty (%) 0.109 0.24 –0.02487 –0.196
Minority (%) 0.072 –0.04385 0.116* 0.222**
Elderly (%) –0.09959 –0.186 0.0159 0.001133
Female-headed
households (%) –0.429* -0.206 –0.108 –0.258
Neighborhood descriptors
Owners (%) 0.237* 0.126 –0.297** –0.323**
Median value ($) 0.0003** 0.000135* 0.000227** 0.000227**
Appreciation median
value (%) –0.011 –0.007216 –0.00061 –0.00371
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) –0.199 –0.41 –0.196 –0.07729
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) 0.059 0.09944* 0.08136* –0.0354
Single-family structures (%) –0.197** –0.144* 0.247** 0.2332**
Number of buses, all routes 0.003* –0.00098 –0.00097 0.000814
Job market descriptors
Workforce unemployed (%) –0.111 0.311 –0.739** –0.264
Total jobs, 1990 0.0002 0.0003 0.00042 –0.0001377
Growth in jobs, 1980–90 (%) 0.004 0.0077* 0.004092 0.00345
Market penetration by lenders
Loans as a percentage
of owner units 0.112* –0.0453 –0.03005 –0.035
Underserved tracts –9.43** –7.537** –3.327* –6.994**
Tracts with low-lending levels 2.403 2.618 1.892 4.702
Constant 53.191** 44.823** 32.877** 39.358**
Number of tracts 343 347 342 363
R2 0.467 0.241 0.227 0.271
*Indicates significant at better than the .05 level.
**Indicates significant at better than the .01 level.
are adequate for cross-sectional analysis such as this. As expected, the housing and neigh-
borhood descriptors tend to be the dominant independent variables in each model because
they generate statistically significant coefficients. However, the signs of these coefficients
are not always as expected, possibly due to the high level of multicolinearity among the
various variables. For example, the variables measuring the percentage of owner-occupied
housing within the tract and the variables measuring the percentage of the stock in single-
family structures seem to pair in each model with sign reversal. Collectively they explain
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some variation in the share of GSE loans among total loans, but the values of the individual
coefficients are suspect given the strong correlation between these two independent variables.
Very few of the variables describing the demographic characteristics of populations in the
tracts passed the significance test, and none passed consistently over the 4 years tested.
The employment variables did not prove to be significant in either direction in any consis-
tent manner. The variable measuring public transit service—a proxy for access to employ-
ment—did not prove to be significant in any consistent manner either. This suggests that
the character of the housing market, in terms of the value of the housing and the presence
of single-family, owner-occupied housing, dominates the tract-level models. It further
suggests that the issues of employment and access to employment are not strong factors
in evaluating the GSEs’ performance in directing credit.
However, the pattern of the coefficients for the dummy variables for underserved tracts is
of interest. In all 4 years, the coefficient for this variable is negative and significant at
better than the .01 level. This suggests an inverse relationship between the level of GSE
lending and the underserved area. Typically, the GSEs’ share of loan ranges from 3.3 to
9.4 percent lower than the non-GSEs, controlling for the characteristics of the population,
the housing stock, and employment opportunities in the tract. This suggests that the GSEs
are not lending based solely upon underwriting concerns. Rather, they are avoiding the
underserved tracts of the metropolitan area.
Analysis for All Borrowers. This particular set of models, summarized in exhibit 12,
generates some difficulty. Given the sample sizes, almost all variables prove to be statisti-
cally significant. However, the independent variables that contribute most to the explana-
tory power of the models (as measured by the values of the standardized coefficients)
indicate the factors that best describe the GSEs’ tendencies in terms of where they pur-
chase loans. The five variables that have the highest explanatory power in the models
across all 4 years are the variables that describe the housing stock of the tracts. These
variables are median value of owner-occupied housing, percent of the housing that is
owner-occupied, percent of the stock that is single family, percent of the stock built in
1989 to 1990, and location within the underserved area.
The coefficients for these variables suggest that standard loan underwriting concerns drive
the GSE loan process. The GSEs have a tendency to purchase loans only in “safe” areas
where the housing stock is of high value and the stock is growing. However, the coeffi-
cient for the variable indicating whether or not the home is located in the underserved area
is significant and negative in all models. This suggests that, controlling for the other fac-
tors describing the tracts, the GSEs tend to purchase loans located outside of the
underserved area.
Analysis for Very Low-Income Borrowers. This set of models, summarized in exhibit
13, uses only the low-income borrowers in the analysis. Here again, the housing variables
seem to dominate as the important factors describing the level of GSE activity in the tracts
where the low-income borrowers have purchased homes. Noticeably absent from these
models is the contribution of the variables describing the employment characteristics of
the tracts. This suggests that the GSEs tend to purchase loans made to very low-income
borrowers whose homes are located in areas with strong housing values but that the GSEs
are not influenced by whether these homes are in underserved areas or are located in close
proximity to employment.
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Exhibit 12
Multivariate Analysis of GSE Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans—
Borrower Level Analysis: All Borrowers
Independent Variables 1993 1994 1995 1996
Population descriptors
Median income ($) –0.00012**    –2E–08** –0.00013** –6.4E–06
Below poverty (%) 0.346** 0.25** –0.07913** –0.07946**
Minority (%) –0.126** –0.167** 0.0753** 0.07028**
Elderly (%) –0.03135** –0.154** –0.09943** –0.06258**
Female-headed
households (%) –0.682** –0.492** –0.491** –0.47**
Neighborhood descriptors
Owners (%) 0.347** 0.235** –0.219** –0.222**
Median value 0.000162** 0.000075** 0.00013** 0.000111**
Appreciation median
value –0.008** –0.00579** 0.000452** –0.0053**
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) –0.629** –0.608** –0.507** –0.178**
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) 0.0528** 0.09243** 0.0673** 0.03966**
Single-family
structures (%) –0.246** –0.201** 0.148** 0.137**
Number of buses,
all routes –0.00103** –0.001852** –0.00219** –0.00196**
Job market descriptors
Workforce unemployed (%) –0.309** 0.527** –0.309* –0.216**
Total jobs, 1990 0.000216** 0.000147** 0.000128** 0.00004**
Growth in jobs, 1980–90 0.00358** 0.00645** –0.00291** 0.00177**
Market penetration by lenders
Loans as a percentage
of owner units 0.104** –0.00053** –0.00302 –0.0175**
Underserved tracts –6.754** –6.346** –2.649** –4.375**
Tracts with low-lending
levels 3.113** 10.263** 6.963** 12.393**
Constant 60.961** 48.529** 39.772** 43.109**
Number of borrowers 57,298 42,918 35,771 45,207
R2 0.542 0.317 0.256 0.303
*Indicates significant at better than the .05 level.
**Indicates significant at better than the .01 level.
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Analysis for Minority Borrowers. This set of models, summarized in exhibit 14, uses
only the minority borrowers in the analysis. As above, the housing value and single-family
structure variables consistently dominate the model. However, there are some differences
with this set of models. The coefficients for underserved tracts are negative and significant
consistently across all years. This suggests that the GSEs play a larger role with minority
loans outside of the underserved area. It appears that the GSEs purchase more loans with
minority borrowers where there is a strong housing market and where there is movement
away from the areas of the city traditionally underserved by the lending industry.
Exhibit 13
Multivariate Analysis of GSE Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans—
Borrower Level Analysis: Very Low-Income Borrowers
Independent Variables 1993 1994 1995 1996
Population descriptors
Median income ($) –0.0007** –0.00069** 0.000265* –0.00009
Below poverty (%) 0.175 –0.132 –0.192* –0.534**
Minority (%) –0.6374 –0.171** 0.0607* 0.101**
Elderly (%) –0.04702 0.08319 0.506** 0.124
Female-headed
households (%) –0.461** 0.13 0.719** –0.155
Neighborhood descriptors
Owners (%) 0.721** –0.06756 –0.397** 0.01834
Median value ($) 0.0001423* 0.0004395** 0.00034** 0.00324**
Appreciation median
value (%) –0.00537 –0.03805 0.00138 0.145**
Structures built, 1989–90 (%) –0.167 –0.179 –0.423** –0.582**
Structures built, pre-1940 (%) –0.069* 0.05173* 0.0955** 0.106**
Single-family structures (%) –0.547** 0.108* 0.286** –0.0618
Number of buses, all routes 0.00836** 0.001143 –0.00753** –0.001456
Job market descriptors
Workforce unemployed (%) –1.313** 0.453* –0.625** 0.323*
Total jobs, 1990 0.00003778 0.0001 0.000263 –0.000564**
Growth in jobs, 1980–90 0.002339 0.00437 0.01055** 0.00069
Market penetration by lenders
Loans as a percent of
owner units 0.06104 –0.193** –0.236** –0.126**
Underserved tracts –7.507** –8.653** 2.646** –1.52
Tracts with low-lending
levels 6.475** –3.929* 5.449** 9.29**
Constant 62.78** 35.802** 28.132* 19.06**
Number of borrowers                    2,287             2,814              2,792 3,063
R2 0.207 0.18 0.184 0.155
*Indicates significant at better than the .05 level.
**Indicates significant at better than the .01 level.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
This analysis of the Kansas City metropolitan area suggests that efforts to encourage the
GSEs to direct credit to areas traditionally underserved by the mortgage lending industry
and to direct credit to low-income and minority borrowers is meeting with mixed success.
In general, the GSEs are, at best, indifferent to whether loans originate within the under-
Exhibit 14
Multivariate Analysis of GSE Loans as a Percentage of Total Loans—Borrower
Level Analysis: Minority Borrowers
Independent Variables 1993 1994 1995 1996
Population descriptors
Median income ($) –0.000389** –0.000134 –6.6E–05 –0.00022*
Below poverty (%) 0.78** –0.14 –0.213** –0.253**
Minority (%) –0.01767 –0.238** 0.06766* 0.172**
Elderly (%) –0.659** –0.142* –0.113* 0.05639
Female-headed
households (%) –0.245 0.0962 –0.145 0.06568
Neighborhood descriptors
Owners (%) 0.119 0.063 –0.389** –0.297**
Median value ($) 0.000116** 0.00022** 0.00014** 0.00027**
Appreciation median
value (%) –0.0323** 0.0145** 0.0214** 0.0306**
Structures built,
1989–90 (%) –1.094** –0.253* 0.04825 –0.248**
Structures built,
pre-1940 (%) –0.12** –0.101** 0.166** 0.173**
Single-family structures (%) –0.22* –0.156** 0.183** 0.227**
Number of buses, all routes 0.004** 0.0007 –0.00165 –0.004575**
Job market descriptors
Workforce unemployed (%) –0.828** 1.227** –0.474** –0.377**
Total jobs, 1990 0.0006437** 0.0006** –0.00011 0.005706**
Growth in jobs, 1980–90 0.0056** 0.00328* 0.0001 0.01138**
Market penetration by lenders
Loans as a percentage
of owner units 0.0693** –0.09745** –0.0633* –0.004887
Underserved tracts –15.674** –5.17** –5.429** –9.795**
Tracts with low-lending 7.846** 6.717** 4.377** 11.016**
levels
Constant 48.418** 39.218** 39.456** 24.985**
Number of borrowers                    2,879             3,037 3,211 3,670
R2 0.488 0.219 0.116 0.242
*Indicates significant at better than the .05 level.
**Indicates significant at better than the .01 level.
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served areas. However, the GSEs are helping very low-income and minority borrowers to
purchase homes in neighborhoods that enjoy strong housing and employment opportuni-
ties. These housing and employment opportunities are better than those found in the
underserved areas. In broad brushstrokes, this suggests that the place-based approach
(sending mortgage credit to specific neighborhoods) is not working well, but the borrower-
based approach (sending mortgage credit to targeted populations) is working well.
This does not mean that the place-based approach of attempting to bring credit to tradi-
tionally underserved areas is without merit. The analysis of the Kansas City housing and
employment markets makes it clear that there are areas that have not received their full
share of mortgage credit. These tracts tend to have poorer populations, lower value hous-
ing, and fewer employment opportunities. The underserved area is, however, quite broad,
encompassing about one-half of the tracts within the metropolitan area. Such a broad
definition of underserved tends to dilute the effectiveness of the efforts to direct credit
where it would not otherwise go. A more narrow approach to identifying the neighbor-
hoods of the metropolitan area that suffer from insufficient mortgage lending suggests
that about one-sixth of the neighborhoods in the metropolitan area have very low levels of
lending within their boundaries. The tracts with low levels of lending are, however, mar-
kets that can be characterized as having low housing value, as having low or declining
employment, and as having populations with high concentrations of poverty and minori-
ties. This then seems to be the crux of the problem with identifying areas in need of addi-
tional mortgage credit. If the definition is broad, many areas that have strong housing and
employment markets will be included. But this very inclusive definition results in desig-
nating areas as underserved that experience normal levels of mortgage lending activity. If
the definition is narrow, including only those areas that truly receive very little mortgage
lending, then these areas often contain poor housing and few employment opportunities.
The execution of the GSE Act of 1992 has opted for the broader approach, but as this
research has shown, the GSEs have had mixed success at meeting the act’s goals.
The alternative approach to directing mortgage credit—the borrower-based approach—
has shown some promise. With this approach, mortgage credit is directed to the two tar-
geted populations of very low-income households and minority households. It appears
that these very low-income and minority borrowers are using the available mortgage
credit to purchase homes in neighborhoods with strong housing and employment markets.
It is true that these target populations locate in neighborhoods with lower housing values,
greater poverty, higher unemployment, and fewer jobs than is true for the market as a
whole. However, these target populations do locate in neighborhoods with generally
stronger demographic, housing, and employment characteristics than are found in the
areas that are designated as underserved.
How did the GSEs perform in the Kansas City area in serving the twin approaches to
influencing the flow of mortgage credit? It would appear that the GSEs have experi-
enced greater success in assisting the targeted populations than they have in assisting the
underserved areas. Generally, the GSEs purchase loans in those tracts with higher levels
of household income, higher median home values, and higher numbers of jobs than did
the conventional lenders. Thus, the GSEs tend to purchase loans in tracts outside the
underserved areas.
The GSEs tend to lag behind the industry in the proportion of loans made to very low-
income and minority borrowers. Thus, the GSEs do not target poor and minority borrow-
ers as well as the other primary mortgage lenders. However, this does not mean that the
GSEs fail to purchase loans originated with very low-income and minority lenders; rather,
they have not led the industry in this regard. When loans to very low-income and minority
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borrowers are purchased, these loans tend to be located in strong neighborhoods. The
GSE loans to very low-income households are located in tracts with better home values
and larger numbers of jobs than are found with the non-GSE loans or are found in the
underserved areas. The GSE loans to minority borrowers are located in tracts with much
higher home values and household income levels. They have larger numbers of jobs and
much stronger job growth. But with either target population, very low-income borrowers
or minority borrowers, the proportions of GSE loans to the underserved areas are below
those of the non-GSEs.
The multivariate models suggest that the GSEs’ performance is driven by standard under-
writing concerns, that is with making loans in areas with strong housing markets. At the
tract level, the GSEs’ level of participation in the lending within each neighborhood is
influenced primarily by the underlying value of the housing involved, and not with the
employment conditions that exist in these neighborhoods. At the borrower level, the
GSEs’ level of participation in lending can be described as a “flight to safety.” Among all
borrowers, the GSEs play the strongest role in the mortgage markets where the loans are
located away from the underserved areas. Similarly, among the low-income borrowers,
the GSEs are strongest where the housing is of sound value, and the GSEs seem to be
neutral to the employment opportunities. Among the minority borrowers, the GSEs are
also strongest where the housing is of sound value, but there are weak indications that the
employment opportunities do guide the investment decisions.
What does this analysis suggest with regard to the future regulation of the GSEs? The
research results are not so definitive that strong, clear implications can be derived. The
message of this research is mixed at best. However, the general conclusions are that di-
recting mortgage credit to specific borrowers seems to generate better housing and neigh-
borhood outcomes than is true with directing mortgage credit to specific neighborhoods.
This would suggest that attention should be focused on improving the flow of credit to the
target populations. The benefit of this approach is that it seems to be succeeding in help-
ing very low-income and minority households obtain housing in neighborhoods that pro-
vide both good housing investment and good access to employment. The difficulty with
this approach is that it is very hard to argue against the place-based approach.
The ongoing concern with revitalization of urban areas requires that government policies
support the various efforts that foster the redevelopment of deteriorated areas. Certainly,
access to mortgage credit in areas where there is a need for revitalization is one among
many necessities for revitalization to succeed. Access to mortgage credit will not, in and
of itself, bring about the redevelopment. For any deteriorated area to revive, the resident
population will need income to pay for housing debt and to support area businesses. This
income must come from jobs, and if the jobs are not present in the deteriorated areas, or
are not readily accessible from those areas, then no amount of mortgage credit will make
the revitalization possible. However, if an economic development policy can succeed in
bringing jobs to these deteriorated areas, then it is important that adequate amounts of
mortgage credit be available in these areas so that the economic development can have
the desired spillover effects of investment in area housing.
However, this research suggests that a borrower-based approach works better. It suggests
that borrowers in general, and very low-income and minority borrowers in particular, use
the mortgage credit to locate in neighborhoods with strong housing markets that have
housing of good value, with good rates of investment in new housing. These neighbor-
hoods also have strong employment markets with high numbers of jobs, strong rates of
job growth, and relatively low rates of unemployment. This means that these borrowers
use the mortgage credit to move out of the central city and move to the better housing and
employment prospects in the outlying areas of the city.
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Notes
1. Quigley (1994), p. 103.
2. Very low-income is defined as income below 50 percent of the area median family
income (AMFI), and low-income is defined as income below 80 percent of AMFI.
3. Minority households are defined as those households who are either non-White or
Hispanic.
4. U.S. Department of Commerce (1994), table 1209, p. 733.
5. U.S. Department of Commerce (1994), table 749, p. 491.
6. This base analysis combining the GSE and non-GSE borrowers was performed
only for 1996, rather than for 1993 through 1996, as little variation over time has
been found.
7. The “jumbo” loan limits eliminate only the largest loans, generally those
over $200,000.
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Appendix
Data Description
The test site for this research is the Kansas City metropolitan area. Tract level and bor-
rower data have been used to assess which of the two approaches better serves the public
interest. The data include the GSE Public Use Database, the HMDA database, census
data, Mid-America Regional Council data, and Kansas City Area Transit Authority data.
GSE Public Use Database. The GSE Public Use Census Tract Database has been ac-
quired for the Kansas City metropolitan area. The data have been assembled for years
1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. The GSE data are at the level of individual loans. For each
year, the GSE data describe borrower’s income, race, and the census tract where the
home is located. The data have been aggregated to the census-tract level. By merging the
borrower-level data with the census-tract data, it is possible to assess the demographic,
housing, and employment characteristics of neighborhoods where the borrowers locate.
1980 and 1990 Census of Population and Housing. Data from the United States Bureau
of the Census (STF3) have been assembled, providing descriptions of the housing stock
and the populations that reside in each of the tracts in the Kansas City metropolitan area.
These include:
■ Population descriptors.
– Median family income.
– Percentage of the population that is below poverty.
– Percentage of the population that is a member of a racial or ethnic minority.
– Percentage of the population that is elderly.
– Percentage of the households that is female-headed.
– Percentage of the workforce that is unemployed.
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■ Neighborhood and Housing Stock descriptors.
– Percentage of the housing stock that is owner-occupied.
– Median value of the owner-occupied stock.
– Percentage appreciation of the median value of owner-occupied housing,
1980 to 1990.
– Percentage of the 1990 housing stock built in 1989 or 1990.
– Percentage of the housing stock built before 1940.
– Percentage of housing units in single-family structures.
Mid-America Regional Council. Employment data from the Mid-America Regional
Council (MARC) have been assembled. This database counts the number of jobs in each
census tract. These data are broken down by major employment sector. The database also
provides information on the growth or decline in the number of jobs in each tract from
1980 to 1990. The MARC data include:
■ Total employment in each tract in 1990.
■ Percent change in employment from 1980 to 1990.
■ Employment in 1990 in agriculture, construction, transportation, communications,
and utilities.
■ Employment in 1990 in manufacturing.
■ Employment in 1990 in finance, insurance, real estate, and government.
■ Employment in 1990 in retailing.
The coverage of the MARC data is not the same as the coverage of the GSE database. The
GSE database includes some census tracts in outlying, essentially rural counties. As such,
the analysis has been limited to those tracts where both GSE and MARC data are avail-
able. This includes 432 tracts in 8 counties. The tracts dropped from the analysis were
located in outlying counties with very few housing transactions.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data. HMDA data were obtained for the years 1993
through 1996 for the Kansas City metropolitan area. The data were extracted separately
for each year from the national database published by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council. These data were Loan Application Records (LAR) for the Kansas
City Missouri-Kansas metropolitan statistical area covering the eight counties in Kansas
and Missouri covered by the MARC and GSE data. The LAR data cover many types of
loan transactions for many purposes. The research reported here is interested only in
homes purchased for owner occupancy. As a result, the LAR data were filtered, selecting
only those records that describe:
■ A loan for a home purchase (excluding loans for home improvements, refinancing,
and multifamily structures).
■ A loan for owner occupancy (excluding all purchases for rental purposes).
■ A loan that was originated by the lender or purchased by the lender (excluding all
loan applications that were denied, withdrawn, or otherwise did not close).
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In addition, the LAR data records include many records for which some of the fields in-
clude errors. These errors include quality errors and/or validity errors. Records with either
type of error have been discarded from this analysis.
The selected LAR data records were aggregated to the level of census tracts. For each
tract, summary fields have been created describing:
■ The total number of loans closed in the tract.
■ The count of borrowers with income less than 50 percent of AMFI.
■ The count of borrowers who are members of racial or ethnic minorities.
Kansas City Area Transit Authority. The Kansas City Area Transit Authority operates
the area’s primary public transit system, which is a series of bus lines. Data on the loca-
tion and frequency of these lines have been made available. Each census tract has been
rated in terms of the bus access by evaluating the number of lines and the frequency of the
bus service. The rating describes the buses serving each census tract from all routes within
the tract during a normal working day.
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